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Abstract
Considerable research has pointed towards processing differences as a viable means for understanding the strength
and likelihood of a framing effect. In the current study we explored how differences in processing may emerge through
diurnal patters in circadian rhythm, which varies across individuals. We predicted that during circadian off-times,
participants would exhibit stronger framing effects whereas framing effects would be relatively weaker during on-times.
Six-hundred and eighty ﬁve individuals took part in the study; the ﬁndings supported our hypothesis, revealing a diurnal
pattern of risk responding that varies across the 24-hour circadian cycle.
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1 Introduction
The most studied examples of risk and decision making
revolve around risky-choice framing (Levin, Schneider &
Gaeth, 1998), which has its foundations in prospect the-
ory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). According to prospect
theory, the presentation of an outcome as either a loss or
gain affects the amount of risk a person is willing to ac-
cept. This effect is due to differences in perceived subjec-
tive value and is captured by the S-shaped value function.
This function is concave for gains, which leads to risk-
averse preferences, and convex for losses, which leads to
preference for risky alternatives.
In the most well known example of this framing effect,
participants read of an Asian disease that will potentially
kill 600 people (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The par-
ticipant is then asked to choose between two alternatives
for dealing with the disease. One alternative contains a
certain outcome (e.g., 200 people saved for certain) and
the other has a stated likelihood for an outcome (e.g., a
1/3 probability that all 600 people will be saved and a 2/3
probability that no one will be saved). The alternatives
are presented either positively (people saved) or nega-
tively (people die). Importantly, both of the alternatives
contain exactly the same “expected outcome”, or numer-
ical magnitude. People tend to choose the certain/risk
free option when the problem is framed positively and
the risky option when it is framed negatively.
While this framing effect has proved enduring, a num-
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ber of studies have pointed toward processing differences
as a determining factor for the strength of this framing
effect. One of the most widely investigated personality
factors in framing research is need-for-cognition (NFC)
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). This personality trait reﬂects
the extent to which people engage in effortful thought and
how much they enjoy doing so. Thus, individuals with
high levels of NFC should process tasks more effortfully
whereas individuals low in this trait should use less effort.
Research has shown that framing effects are lessened for
individuals who are high in NFC (e.g., Chatterjee, Heath,
Milberg & France, 2000; Curseu, 2006; Smith & Levin,
1996; Zhang & Buda, 1999). Similar results were found
by Simon, Fagley and Halleran (2004) when high NFC
was combined with math ability or depth of processing.
Related research has shown that merely requesting an
elaboration or rationale (Miller & Fagley, 1991; Sieck
& Yates, 1997) can inﬂuence the likelihood of fram-
ing effects. Other research has shown that presenting a
task as either high or low in personal importance, which
should lead to more or less effortful processing respec-
tively, inﬂuences the likelihood of framing effects (e.g.,
Biswas, 2009; Igou & Bless, 2007; Leny-Meyers & Mah-
eswaran, 2004; McElroy & Seta, 2003; McElroy & Mas-
cari, 2007). Overall, the ﬁndings from these studies tend
to show that, when more effort is involved in the task, this
framing effect is attenuated, with one exception (Igou &
Bless, 2007). In a somewhat similar approach, research
from fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991) has
shown that, when greater “gist like” memory retrieval is
used, framing effects are robust whereas, when the more
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precise “verbatim” retrieval is relied on, framing effects
are less evident. Recent investigations have shown sup-
port for fuzzy trace as a viable means for understanding
framing effects (Kuhberger & Tanner, 2009).
One ability factor that has been identiﬁed is numer-
acy, which refers to the propensity to integrate complex
numeric information. Research (Peters & Levin, 2008;
Peters et al., 2006) has shown that low numerate individ-
uals respond more superﬁcially to non-numeric sources
of information (i.e., frame) and consequently, they have
been shown to demonstrate stronger framing effects (for
review see Reyna, Nelson, Han & Dieckmann, 2009).
In an investigation of another individual difference vari-
able, Frederick (2005) used a Cognitive Reﬂection Test
to show that risky-choice framing effects were attenuated
for people relying on more conscious, deliberative pro-
cessing and more robust for people using more automatic
processing. Similar ﬁndings were reported by Oechssler,
Roider, & Schmitz (2009).
Other research has shown that ability differences may
inﬂuence this framing effect. In one study, Stanovich
and West (1998) found that individuals with relatively
higher cognitive ability, as measured by SAT scores, were
less likely to exhibit framing effects. Later research has
shown that working memory also plays a role in fram-
ing effects (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Corbin, McElroy &
Black, 2010) but the exact nature of this role has not been
completely deﬁned. Recently, however, Stanovich and
West (2008) have reexamined their original assumptions
in a larger study and their ﬁndings seem to call their prior
hypotheses for framing effects into question.
Taken together, these ﬁndings create a picture of how
framing effects can differ across individuals and situa-
tions. Clearly the type of processing involved can have
important and predictable inﬂuences on the choices peo-
plemake. Theseﬁndingssuggestthatframingeffectswill
be less likely when a person is being more thoughtful,
diligent, or involved in the decision task. A variety of fac-
tors may inﬂuence the effort and deliberative processing a
person uses. One way that humans vary in this respect is
diurnally, in a cyclic pattern known as circadian rhythm.
1.1 Circadian rhythms.
The circadian rhythm describes variations in our diurnal
patterns that are relatively stable (e.g., Wever, 1992) and
independent of both the sleep-wake cycle and body tem-
perature (Folkard, Hume, Minors, Waterhouse, & Wat-
son, 1985). A number of biological and psychologi-
cal factors vary in accordance with the daily biological
rhythm. The ﬁndings in this area show that during “on
times” (e.g., 10:00 a.m.) people perform tasks with more
cognitive effort relative to “off times” (e.g., 3:00 a.m.)
(e.g., Martin & Marrington, 2005; Monk & Leng, 1986).
Research has also revealed a daily pattern in alertness that
helps identify psychological components that vary across
the circadian cycle.
For example, Akerstedt, Folkard and Portin (2004)
presented an interactive computer model that addresses
the question of alertness and performance in everyday
life. According to this model, daily alertness levels are
composed of three parameters: circadian rhythm, time
from awakening and the wakeup process. The ﬁndings
most pertinent for our investigation reveal that, for alert-
ness levels, the daily circadian cycle appears to oscillate
throughout the day, typically reaching a peak around 6
p.m. and decreasing steadily until around 6 a.m. at which
point the pattern begins again.
Attesting to the effect of circadian rhythms on judg-
ments, Bodenhausen (1990) measured the effects of cir-
cadian match on stereotype usage. Here, circadian match
refers to performance at a more alert point during one’s
circadian rhythm (the alternative being circadian mis-
match). Bodenhausen hypothesized that circadian mis-
match would constrain cognitive resources and thereby
lead to greater reliance on judgmental heuristics (Boden-
hausen, 1990). Across two studies, stereotype judgments
had predictable diurnal patterns, with morning types re-
lying more on heuristics for stereotype judgments during
evening hours and evening types relying more on stereo-
type judgments during morning hours.
A domain of research related to circadian rhythm is
that of sleep deprivation, which has been found to in-
ﬂuence the quality of decision making (e.g., McKenna,
Dickinson, & Drummond, 2007). In a review of the lit-
erature on this topic, Harrison and Horne (2000) found
compelling evidence that sleep deprivation and fatigue
impair decision making for some complex tasks. More
recently, adverse sleep states have been shown to lead
to less than optimal decision making in a higher-level
decision task involving iterative reasoning (Dickinson &
McElroy, 2010). However, other research suggests that
sleep deprivation does not necessarily harm the quality
of a Bayesian decision (Dickinson & Drummond, 2008).
Thus, the effects of sleep deprivation, and therefore fa-
tigue, may be domain speciﬁc.
1.2 Predictions
We have reviewed a number of studies that provide a gen-
eral framework of factors that inﬂuence the likelihood of
framing effects. These studies point toward a general-
ized notion that more thoughtful, effortful or deliberative
processing will attenuate framing effects. This manner
of processing is especially likely during circadian “on-
times”. Conversely, less thoughtful, less effortful or more
automatic processing will result in stronger framing ef-
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this manner when they are fatigued due to circadian “off-
times”. In the current investigation we tested this hypoth-
esis by manipulating the time-of-day when participants
completed a framing task.
2 Method
2.1 Participants and design
Six-hundredandeightyﬁveindividuals, including402fe-
males and 282 males took part in the study; the average
age of our participants was 23.3. Participants were stu-
dents recruited via email for each 24-hour time slot. The
design of our study was a 2 (off time, on time) x 2 (gain,
loss) between subjects design. Participants’ level of re-
ported risk preference was our dependent variable.
2.2 Procedure and materials
A large student email list of various majors was obtained
and used to invite participants to take part in a 10-minute
study, which they could access via hyperlink. The study
had to be completed during a speciﬁed and randomly as-
signed one-hour time slot indicated in the email invita-
tion. Random assignment to a gain/loss framing condi-
tion was also done ex ante. Participants were offered
entry into a drawing for a cash prize of $100 (9 a.m. to
11p.m. time slots) or $300 (midnight to 8 a.m. time slots)
in return for their participation. Our sample was derived
only from those who responded to our invitation. The
survey software program recorded start and completion
times for each participant. This same recruitment took
place across two semesters, with prize drawings at the
end of each semester.
Upon accessing the online survey, participants were
ﬁrst presented with informed consent, followed by sev-
eral demographic questions. Next, they were presented
with our measure of circadian rhythm, the reduced Horne
and Östberg inventory (rH&D). The rH&D is a shortened
version of the Horne and Östberg (1976) inventory and
has been shown to have good validity (Adan & Almi-
rall, 1991). The rH&D was followed by questions assess-
ing recent sleep levels and caffeine consumption. Next,
participants were presented with the Asian disease prob-
lem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) followed by a risk-free
and risky alternative; both alternatives were framed either
positively or negatively. Participants were then asked to
rate their preference toward the alternatives on a 7-point
scale from “Deﬁnitely would recommend Program A” to
“Deﬁnitely would recommend Program B”. The use of
a scale rather than dichotomous choice has been shown
to be a valid measure of risk preference (Levin, Gaeth,
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). The midpoint on our scale
Table 1: Average risk response as a function of time-of-
day and frame for the Asian disease problem.
Gains Losses
Time of day N Risk
response
N Risk
response
1 a.m. 19 3.3 15 4.0
2 a.m. 15 3.1 12 4.7
3 a.m. 15 2.9 11 4.4
4 a.m. 15 3.3 10 4.5
5 a.m. 2 3.5 13 4.5
6 a.m. 8 4.5 11 4.6
7 a.m. 13 3.6 10 4.3
8 a.m. 18 3.1 12 4.8
9 a.m. 10 3.8 12 3.8
10 a.m. 20 3.6 17 4.1
11 a.m. 17 3.2 17 3.7
12 p.m. 15 2.9 8 5.1
1 p.m. 16 3.2 1 4.4
2 p.m. 22 3.7 1 5.3
3 p.m. 17 3.7 17 4.7
4 p.m. 16 3.1 20 5.1
5 p.m. 16 2.8 21 4.3
6 p.m. 12 4.8 11 4.6
7 p.m. 21 3.4 11 3.9
8 p.m. 8 3.8 11 3.5
9 p.m. 12 4.3 13 4.4
10 p.m. 10 2.9 6 5.5
11 p.m. 14 4.3 17 4.1
12 a.m. 19 3.1 11 4.3
was “4” which is indicative of neutrality; numeric rat-
ings above this point indicate greater preference for the
risky alternative whereas ratings below indicate prefer-
ence for the risk-averse alternative. After making their
choice, participants were asked several remaining ques-
tions and then thanked for participating.
3 Results
In our initial examination, we tested for evidence of this
framing effect for all participants across the 24-hour as-
signed times. This analysis revealed the typical framing
effect F (1,668) = 47, p< .001 and the data are presented
in Table 1. However, it is evident that cell sizes are un-Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5, No. 7, December 2010 Thoughtful days and valenced nights 519
Table 2: Average risk response as a function of time-of-
day and frame for the Asian disease problem.
Gains Losses
Time of day N Risk
response
N Risk
response
1 a.m.–3 a.m. 49 3.1 38 4.3
4 a.m.–6 a.m. 25 3.7 34 4.5
7 a.m.–9 a.m. 41 3.4 34 4.3
10 a.m.–12 p.m. 52 3.3 42 4.1
1 p.m.–3 p.m. 55 3.5 51 4.8
4 p.m.–6 p.m. 44 3.4 52 4.7
7 p.m.–9 p.m. 41 3.8 35 3.9
10 p.m.–12 a.m. 43 3.4 34 4.4
equal in many of the off-time hours, to gain a better per-
spective we combined the data into 3-hour increments,
presented in Table 2. Because of the temporal variabil-
ity in the presentation of our data, we next observed par-
ticipants circadian typology. Consistent with the liter-
ature examining young adult samples (Chelminski, Pet-
ros, Plaud & Ferraro, 2000), we found the percentage of
morningtypesinoursampletobeverylow, withlessthan
1 percent of our sample meeting the “moderate” or “def-
inite” morning type criteria. Given the low percentage,
we excluded morning types from further analysis and fo-
cused on the majority of our university sample.
To examine our primary circadian-match hypothesis,
we ﬁrst needed to divide the 24-hour cycle into “on” and
“off” times for our population. To accomplish this we re-
lied on previous research (e.g., Díaz-Morales & Sánchez-
López, 2005; Smith, et al., 2002). This research shows
the following on-times for evening types (9:00 a.m. to
1:59 p.m., 5:00 p.m. to 1:59 a.m.), daily off-times (2:00
a.m. to 8:59 a.m.), and “siesta” off-time hours (2:00 p.m.
to 4:59 p.m.).
Based upon the on- and off-time sorting, the average
risk response across frame and circadian match/mismatch
for participants is reported in Table 3. We next performed
an ANOVA on all of our participants with frame and cir-
cadian match/mismatch as our independent variables and
risk response as our dependent variable. This analysis re-
vealed a signiﬁcant main effect for framing F (1, 666) =
47.1, p < .001, a main effect that approached signiﬁcance
for circadian match/mismatch F (1, 666) = 3.2, p < .08 as
wellasthepredictedcircadianmatchbyframeinteraction
F (1, 666) = 4.7, p < .041.
1We also performed an analysis using only participants who were
classiﬁed as “moderate” or “strong” evening types. This analysis re-
vealed a similar pattern of data with a main effect for circadian match
Table 3: Average risk response as a function of circadian
times-of-day and frame for the Asian disease problem.
Gains Losses
Circadian
times-of-day
N Risk
response
N Risk
response
Off times 141 3.4 133 4.7
On times 209 3.5 187 4.2
To further examine our data we performed contrast
analyses which revealed framing effects in both the cir-
cadian off-times F (1, 666) = 36.7, p < .001 as well as on-
times F (1, 666) = 15.1, p < .001, testifying to the robust-
ness of framing effects while also depicting the effects
of time-of-day. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the
variability present in our interaction was due almost ex-
clusively to the losses condition which revealed a highly
signiﬁcant difference between circadian on and off times
F (1, 666) = 7.52, p < .001. In sharp contrast, there was
no difference between circadian on and off times for the
gains framing condition F (1, 666) = .08, p > .7.
4 Discussion
Our ﬁndings provide support for the overall robustness
of framing effects across the 24-hour day and also reveal
a diurnal pattern of risk responding that depicts a pre-
dictable pattern for strength in framing effects across the
daily cycle. Our predictions are derived from two sources
of literature. First, research on framing effects has shown
that more effortful and deliberative processing will atten-
uate framing effects, whereas less effort and more auto-
matic processing will enhance this framing effect. Re-
search on circadian rhythms has shown that individuals
are more fatigued and tend to use less cognitive effort
during circadian “off times” than “on times”. Based on
these two areas of research, we predicted that framing ef-
fects would be stronger during circadian “off times” and
relatively weaker during “on times”. The results from our
study support this hypothesis.
Our ﬁndings provide evidence for daily variations in
the strength of this framing effect, a variable that should
beofinteresttothoseinvestigatingriskanddecisionmak-
F (1, 312) = 4.1, p< .05, frame F (1, 312) = 24.7, p< .001 and a frame
by circadian match interaction that approached signiﬁcance F (1, 312)
= 3.3, p< .08. In light of the ﬁndings of our primary analysis, we per-
formed a post-hoc analysis to test whether the gains and losses con-
ditions differed across the circadian match conditions. This analysis
revealed that the losses condition differed across the circadian match
conditions F (1, 161) = 7.5, p< .007 but the gains condition did not F (1,
151) = .01, p> .9.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5, No. 7, December 2010 Thoughtful days and valenced nights 520
ing. Identifying new variables, especially those com-
mon to all humans, that constrain or enhance biases in
decision-making is especially important. As prior theo-
retical work has shown, we are constrained in our deci-
sion making abilities (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1993; Simon 1990), the current study identiﬁes how this
constraint may vary diurnally.
It is curious that circadian effects seem exclusive to
the losses condition, leaving the gains condition seem-
ingly unaffected. At ﬁrst glance, this gain/loss discrep-
ancy seems contradictory to previous research by Wat-
son, Wiese, Vaidya and Tellegen (1999).2 In their stud-
ies, Watson focused on how positive and negative affect
may be related to circadian rhythm. In their model, they
propose positive and negative activation as biologically
based systems that vary in accordance with bodily states.
The premise most related to our current study focuses on
how positive and negative mood activation varies across
the day. Their ﬁndings suggest that negative mood is rela-
tively stable across the awakening hours. Positive mood,
however, shows vicissitude, being very low after awak-
ening (e.g., 6 a.m.) and increasing steadily to plateau
and then dropping off again in the evening hours (e.g.,
7 p.m.).
While the Watson et al. ﬁndings seem contradictory,
theymay actually provide an explanation for the gain/loss
discrepancy in our study and a nexus to related research.
First, it is important to point out that we focused on
how risky decision making was inﬂuenced by positively
or negatively valenced information, whereas the Watson
studies focused on internal mood states. A closely re-
lated line of research by Isen and colleagues (e.g., Isen
& Geva, 1987; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Isen, Nygren, &
Ashby, 1988)alsolooksathowmoodmayinﬂuencerisky
choice. These studies show that individuals in a positive
moodaremoresensitivetolosses, showingmorenegative
subjective utility, whereas sensitivity to gains is relatively
unchanged as a function of positive mood. However, for
individuals in a negative mood, there appears to be no
difference in sensitivity to either gains or losses.
The contrast of ﬁndings from the Watson et al. stud-
ies and the Isen et al. studies presents a picture of mood
states and valence sensitivity that can describe our data
well. Speciﬁcally, research by Watson shows that only
positive mood seems to vary across the diurnal circadian
cycle. The research from Isen and colleagues shows that,
as levels of positive mood vary, so too does a person’s
sensitivity to losses information but not gains. Therefore
it is reasonable that we should observe diurnal circadian
effects for the losses condition and not for gains. While
this reasoning is post-hoc, it suggests that further investi-
gation of the interaction between mood states and prob-
2We thank Irwin Levin for his thoughtful insights which led us to
develop this point.
lem valence is important for future research.
Another variable that may warrant future consideration
for circadian effects on gain loss sensitivity is the social
context within which the problem is presented. For ex-
ample, Wang, Simons and Brédart (2001) found that so-
cial context can determine whether the framing effect is
driven by the gains or losses condition. We did not ex-
amine social context as a variable, so this is a possible
subject for future research.
Futureresearchshouldalsoexaminevariablesthatmay
interact with daily variations in circadian rhythm. For ex-
ample, examining whether variables that can elicit high
levels of arousal (Cheng & Chiou, 2008; Fagley & Miller,
1997; McElroy & Seta, 2006; Miller & Fagley, 1991;
Wang, Simons, & Brédart, 2001; Wang, 2006) will atten-
uateoroverridecircadianrhythmeffectsseemswarranted
(Akerstedt, Folkard, & Portin, 2004).
Similarly, increased motivation may inﬂuence the ef-
fects of circadian rhythm. For example, consider a study
by Horne (1988) which involved a vigilance task wherein
higher levels of motivation were induced (via monetary
reward). This study found that participant’s maintained
performance levels similar to controls up until about
thirty six hours of sleep deprivation. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that some of the physiological effects of sleep de-
privation on higher mental functions can be overcome
with proper incentive. Similar conclusions can be drawn
from a study by Baranski et al. (2007) which compared
the motivational factor of being part of a team to work-
ing alone. They found that the motivation attributed to
teamwork can overcome some effects of sleep depriva-
tion. Future research should address whether additional
incentives can overcome the circadian mismatch deﬁcits
we have reported.
Another important question involves the physiological
effects that can occur from circadian rhythm match and
how they may inﬂuence decision making. Addressing
this question, Horne (1988, 1993) proposed a pre-frontal
cortex (PFC) vulnerability hypothesis, which states that
under conditions of sleep deprivation the prefrontal re-
gions of the brain are impaired. Research investigating
this question has shown that, in tasks requiring high lev-
elsofmentalfunctioning, whichisassociatedwithfrontal
lobe activity, performance deteriorates with sleep depri-
vation (Harrison & Horne, 1999). However, there is rea-
son to believe that the deﬁcit in prefrontal activity lev-
els may vary depending on the type of decision task in-
volved (Drummond, Brown, Strieker, Buxton, Wong, &
Gillin, 1999). Future research may beneﬁt from examin-
ing whether PFC deﬁcits are responsible for the types of
circadian effects we have reported.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings, although preliminary, pro-
vide new insight into how diurnal variations inﬂuence
valence processing and risky choice. We have also at-Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5, No. 7, December 2010 Thoughtful days and valenced nights 521
tempted to highlight the future potential for research elu-
cidating how factors associated with circadian variation
interact with the decision task. We are conﬁdent that
many other important factors related to circadian rhythm
remain to be discovered and these will no doubt further
our understanding of human decision processing.
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